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Fish on Academic Freedom: A Merited Assault on 
Nonsense, But Perhaps a Bridge Too Far 
Lawrence Alexander 
In Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to 
Revolution, Stanley Fish turns his prodigious intellectual and rhetorical 
skills to debunking various inflated views of academic freedom and 
defending a narrow, professional account of it.  Academic freedom is 
freedom possessed by the members of university and college departments 
that is not granted to those outside the ivory towers.  For Fish, that freedom 
should rightly only extend to academics in the course of teaching, 
researching, and publishing in accordance with the standards of their 
academic disciplines.  Beyond that, academics are merely employees and 
citizens, with no privileges other than those possessed by other employees 
and citizens. 
Given Fish’s thesis, my job as a commentator is a difficult one.  A 
commentator is supposed to poke holes in the arguments of his target.  He is 
supposed to criticize, not laud.  I, however, agree with Fish, not only with 
his basic thesis, but also with his supporting arguments.  In short, I’m stuck 
with “I couldn’t have said it better myself.” 
Nevertheless, there are perhaps a few jots and tittles in Fish’s 
arguments that I can object to or at least query.  I think Fish at times forgets 
how completely inert the postmodern critique is, a point he otherwise 
recognizes.  And I think Fish, in attempting to hermetically seal off the 
academy from external justification, has taken his argument farther than it 
needs to be taken to secure his account of the academy and its freedom.  
(That’s the “bridge too far” of my title.) 
 THE FISH VIEW OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
What is the role of an academic such that there is a tenable claim to a 
freedom not possessed by others?  Fish distinguishes five different 
“schools” of conceptions of that role.  The first is the “it’s just a job” 
school.  The academic’s job is to acquire and propagate knowledge 
according to disciplinary norms.  His is a profession in which competence is 
judged by standards internal to the profession.  Academic freedom is 
nothing more than the freedom necessary for doing the academic’s job. 
The second school of conceptions of the academic role is that of 
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serving the common good.  The academic performs this role criticizing 
public opinion and promoting freedom, justice, and democracy. 
The third school is that of academic exceptionalism.  Because they 
serve the common good, academics are exceptional beings who deserve 
special privileges. 
The fourth school views the academic role as critique.  That is, 
academics must not only serve the common good.  They must also turn 
inward and criticize the norms of their disciplines, exposing the historical, 
political, cultural, racial, etc. biases which underlie those norms. 
The fifth school views the academic as a revolutionary.  Academics 
must be the vanguard of a revolt against the corrupt, oppressive, and unjust 
regime that is reflected in all the institutions of society, including the 
university and its disciplines. 
Fish endorses the first, the “it’s just a job,” conception of the academic 
role.  Being an academic is being a member of a profession that has its own 
standards of competence and that provides a service that others value 
sufficiently to sustain that profession.  And academic freedom is the 
freedom of the profession to set its own standards and to judge competence 
and shoddiness thereby.  It is a freedom that is limited to academic matters: 
for example, is so and so a competent historian and teacher, and are the 
claims his book on the American founding based on sufficient evidence and 
the most warranted inferences?  When the academic acts outside of these 
disciplinary roles, as a university employee or as a citizen, he warrants no 
more freedom and immunity than other, non-academic, employees and 
citizens.  Academic freedom stops, so to speak, at the discipline’s edge. 
I wholeheartedly agree with Fish on the “it’s just a job” point and its 
important, but limited, implications for academic freedom.  Indeed, I argued 
as much in an article written several years ago: 
If academic freedom is not some legal right derived from the First 
Amendment, what is it, and what is its importance?  To put it 
succinctly, academic freedom is that freedom from fear of job reprisals 
that is necessary for academics to function as academics.  As such, it is 
a privilege of academics that carries with it a responsibility, namely to 
act as academics. 
What is it then to act as an academic?  It is, first and foremost, to 
follow arguments and evidence where they lead without regard to 
whether they will support one’s political goals or enhance one’s 
popularity or reputation.  The true academic is an advocate only for his 
arguments and evidence.  He is the antithesis of those who know the 
conclusions they wish to reach and cast about for only those arguments 
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and that evidence that can be marshalled in support of those 
conclusions.1 
Given this view of academic role and academic freedom that Fish and I 
share, it follows that the First Amendment offers academics no protection 
that is not offered non-academics.  It does not immunize academics from 
otherwise valid content-neutral restrictions, even when those restrictions 
impede academic work.  Academics can be validly required to receive the 
consent of subjects of experiments even if apprising the subjects 
undermines the scholarly goal.  Academics may be validly prohibited from 
killing people or having sex with minors, even if these prohibitions 
foreclose access to knowledge.  Academics can be validly prohibited from 
stealing others’ computers or lab equipment, again, even if those 
prohibitions impede their research. And what goes for content-neutral 
restrictions goes for content-based ones as well.  Academics may not 
infringe others’ copyrights in producing scholarship, nor is what they 
publish or say in class immunized from defamation suits. 
In terms of the First Amendment, then, the position of academics is not 
different from that of non-academics.  Academics are in a position vis-à-vis 
the First Amendment similar to that of members of the press.  The freedom 
of speech the press possesses is the same freedom others possess.  
Moreover, I believe the absence of special free speech privileges for the 
press and for academics is a good thing for both. For special speech 
privileges granted by government—and courts are part of the government—
would inevitably bring in their wake governmental intervention into 
determining who is a bona fide academic or member of the press and acting 
as an academic or in the role of the press.  Moreover, the special privileges 
would likely as well bring government-imposed responsibilities that could 
distort the proper functioning of academics and the press. 
So the absence of special First Amendment privileges for academics is 
a blessing, not a curse, for the academic enterprise.  So, too, I believe is the 
absence of special employee privileges for academics, either to engage in 
the non-academic managerial decision making of the university employer or 
to criticize the university’s non-academic decisions with impunity.  A 
philosophy professor may have views about recruiting students, raising 
money, and configuring classrooms, but those views do not come from the 
discipline of philosophy and are therefore outside the ambit of academic 
freedom, no matter how wise they are.  Fish is correct in concluding that 
academic freedom does not license a professor’s rejecting the assigned text 
for a multi-sectioned course, but it does license him to write a scholarly 
critique of that text or of multi-sectioning of courses, etc. 
 
1  Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006). 
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Let me turn now to disciplinary standards, the adherence to which 
defines the academic role as opposed to other roles.  Those standards come 
into play when academics assess their students and when they participate in 
hiring decisions, promotion and tenure decisions, and in assessments of the 
work of scholars at other universities.  Now those standards can be stated at 
a level of generality at which all competent members of the discipline will 
agree.  When it comes down to particular cases, however, those standards 
do not provide algorithms, and disagreements about quality within the 
discipline are to be expected. The line between arguments made by other 
academics or by students with which I disagree, and those that I find to be 
incompetent, is not a bright line.  There are positions with which I disagree 
that I admit are clearly competently (if not convincingly) supported, and 
there are positions that are clearly beyond the pale.  In between these polar 
cases is a middle ground where one should expect disagreement about 
competence among competent academics. 
Now, Fish recognizes that one’s academic works and assessments can 
never be totally insulated from one’s background and partisan views.  
Nevertheless, well-trained academics are capable of suppressing their biases 
in their academic work, if not totally, then to a great extent. 
Fish is at his best when he addresses the postmodern critique of 
disciplinary standards.  His principal illustrative foil is Judith Butler.  Butler 
objects to the self-certifying nature of disciplinary norms.  She makes the 
standard postmodern move in pointing out the cultural, linguistic, and other 
contingencies that produce such norms.  She thinks, incorrectly, that this 
insight both discredits the disciplinary norms and that it licenses academics 
to use their positions as platforms for political advocacy. 
Fish disagrees with Butler on both points.  On the latter, the political 
advocacy point, Fish points out that having Butler and other lefties using 
their academic positions to advance their political views provides grist for 
conservatives like David Horowitz to urge that academic departments be 
more politically balanced—i.e., that conservative academics be hired in 
greater numbers.  I agree with Fish that this is the wrong cure for the Butler 
disease; though I sympathize with conservative critics of the striking 
political imbalance in the academy because of the abuse of the academic 
role that so many lefties, like Butler, are guilty of, not only in what they 
teach and write, but also in their hiring and tenure decisions.  Still, like 
Fish, I think the political balance remedy amounts to throwing in the towel 
and conceding that politics is a legitimate academic pursuit.  (For the same 
reason, I oppose affirmative action in faculty hiring.  Whether it’s hiring 
conservatives for ideological balance or hiring blacks, Hispanics, or women 
for “diversity,” using non-academic criteria in decisions that should be 
made solely based on disciplinary standards, is a terrible idea.  Behind it 
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lies the “save the world” conception of the role that Fish and I both reject.) 
Does the postmodern critique discredit the disciplinary standards so 
central to Fish’s and my view of academic freedom?  Not in the least.  To 
explain, allow me to digress for a moment and recapitulate points that I 
made in my earlier pieces on academic freedom. 
Most disciplines worthy of being called disciplines and represented in 
universities are concerned with claims that fall into one of three large 
categories.  The largest category is that of descriptive claims—claims 
about the past, the present, and the future.  Descriptive claims in the 
hard sciences come in all three varieties.  In the social sciences, 
historians in history, political science, sociology, and economics 
departments make claims about the past.  Sociologists, political 
scientists, and economists make claims about the present and provide 
models for predicting the future.  There are well-established criteria for 
determining whether their evidence and arguments satisfy disciplinary 
standards.  (If there are not, then the discipline is not in fact a 
discipline.)  Natural and social scientific claims should be assessable 
with respect to whether they meet appropriate standards of argument 
and evidence without regard to the assessor’s political sympathies. 
 There are other disciplines within the university whose knowledge 
claims are not descriptive of the past, present, or future.  Normative 
claims are a branch of philosophy, and there are well-established 
disciplinary standards for assessing such claims that do not depend on 
one’s normative commitments, or at least not on one’s superficial 
normative commitments.  John Rawls and Robert Nozick were both 
fine normative philosophers, worthy of their Harvard appointments, 
but they disagreed considerably over what is just.  Nonetheless, despite 
those disagreements, each could recognize the other’s academic merits. 
 [Then] . . . there are conceptual knowledge claims that make up a 
considerable amount of what philosophers do and are the staple of 
logicians and mathematicians.2 
Finally, there is a fourth form of disciplinary knowledge, one that is 
emblematic of literary analysis and criticism: “interpretive” knowledge. 
Interpretive claims offer themselves as bases for understanding works 
of literature and art that are not reducible to straightforward factual 
claims, like what authors intended, or to straightforward value claims.  
Interpretive claims present the literary or artistic work as a window 
through which to view basic truths about the human condition—its 
ambitions, foibles, tragedies, glories, virtues, and vices.  A good 
 
2  Id. at 885. 
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interpretation or analysis guides the audience to the most perspicuous 
window the interpreted work makes available.  Moreover, there is a 
real discipline involved here.  There are real standards for what counts 
as a good or bad critical analysis.  It is not just de gustibus.3 
Having described the various academic disciplines and their basic 
methodologies, how does the postmodern critique of the disciplines offered 
by Judith Butler and her ilk fare?  That critique, recall, is that all criteria for 
measuring academic merit are socially constructed, and socially constructed 
primarily by white heterosexual males to preserve their power and 
privilege.  They are nothing but Europhallologocentric tools to oppress 
minorities and women. 
 That the way the “social construction of standards of merit” is 
bandied about in today’s academic culture is absolute philosophical 
rubbish is a point about which I hope I can be brief.  There is, indeed, a 
quite respectable philosophical argument going back to Kant that our 
very perceptions of the external world are structured by categories of 
thought.  Kant believed these categories were fixed; whereas after 
Kant, Hegel and his successors deemed the categories to be products 
of culture and its linguistic accretions.  Kant also believed that behind 
the constructed phenomenal world lay the noumenal world of things-
in-themselves.  Kant’s continental descendants, however, dispensed 
with the noumenal world: the socially constructed phenomenal world 
is all there is.  Postmodernism is the heir to this philosophical tradition 
rejecting foundational claims about the nature of reality and 
proclaiming reality to be the product of categorization that is socially 
and historically contingent. 
 The postmodern view, like all thoroughgoing skeptical views about 
knowledge, is ultimately self-undermining.  Like the claims to 
knowledge it debunks, it also purports to know something about the 
world.  Moreover, its view that our categories are socially constructed 
is an “is” from which absolutely no “ought” follows.  The postmodern 
view surely does not entail the claim that we cannot transcend our 
cultural categories.  Rather, it merely entails the claim that, like the 
rebuilding of Neurath’s boat at sea, transcending our cultural 
categories is something we cannot do all at once and that when we do 
it, we will be using the tools our culture provides us for its own 
transcendence.  Ultimately, the postmodern emphases on social 
construction, perspectivalism, and the ubiquity of “interpretation” 
should be no more paralyzing in the normative, literary, and social 
 
3  Id. at 896-97. 
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scientific domains than in the hard sciences.  As Thomas Nagel has 
insightfully argued, although we can never fully attain a “view from 
nowhere,” we can do better or worse in approaching such a 
perspective, both in scientific and normative matters. 
 The most sophisticated postmodernists, however, realize that 
nothing substantive, and surely nothing normative, follows from the 
postmodern point of view.  Tell me over and over again that my 
thought that it is morally wrong to torture children for sadistic pleasure 
is socially constructed—a product of my time, place, language, or 
whatever—and you will not make even a dent in my belief that the 
view is correct.  Tell me that the law of gravity is a social construction, 
and I will still not walk out my fourth floor window.  (Nor, I might 
add, will any postmodernists I know.  Neither they nor their insurance 
companies are postmodernists in their non-philosophic lives, nor could 
they be.  That is my point.)  Stanley Fish, an icon for many of the 
academic postmodernists who believe that the postmodern insight 
should topple the standards of merit and criticism that I deem 
definitive of the academic enterprise that merits academic freedom, 
himself understands that nothing—absolutely nothing—follows from 
his postmodernism.  He understands, as most of his fellow travelers do 
not, that in recruiting postmodernism in its battle to dethrone the 
reigning standards, the identity politics crowd has enlisted an unarmed 
soldier.  In a world where everything is point of view, reducing a 
position to a point of view cannot be a criticism of it, nor can it be a 
reason for its holders to abandon it.  There is no post-modern escape 
hatch for the identity politics crowd when it is subjected to ordinary 
disciplinary standards of evidence and logical argument.4 
So much for the postmodern critique.  Fish, I am sure, agrees with my 
analysis of the postmodern critique, namely, that it is normatively inert.5  
What is true about it is banal, and what is not banal about it is confused.6 
What, then, about the “problem” that disciplinary standards freeze out 
all challenges to those standards, even if some of these challenges are 
merited?  Fish, in responding to this criticism of disciplinary standards, 
 
4  Id. at 892-93. 
5  I am sure he agrees because he has said so. Why Fish embraces Richard Rorty’s deflationary 
view of historians’ facts puzzles me, however.  If there is a reality of present events, then there is a 
reality of past ones.  And I, perhaps naively, believe historians are attempting to convey to their 
audience that past reality.  If I were Fish, I would exorcise the postmodern remnant suggested by the 
Rorty reference. 
6  As I put it in another article, those “who enlist postmodernism to attack established norms have 
drafted an unarmed soldier.”  Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STANF. L. REV. 
1885, 1897 (1993). 
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correctly notes that whether these challenges are merited perforce must be 
judged by the standards themselves.  This, however, does not foreclose 
change.  The standards may authorize their own alteration.  Einstein 
replaced Newton because the Newtonian calculations proved inadequate by 
their own lights.  That is how disciplinary change can and should occur.  
Fish quotes Judith Thomson, who argues that “new fields, indeed new ideas 
generally, have the burden of proof.”7  Indeed, to abandon our disciplinary 
standards in assessing challenges thereto is psychologically impossible 
individually and catastrophically anarchic institutionally.  Where everyone 
is an academic, no one is. 
Having agreed with Fish to this point, let me now demur to his attempt 
to discredit Robert Post’s view that academic freedom serves the goal of 
producing a better informed democratic citizenry and, more generally, the 
view that academic freedom serves external goals.  That is the “bridge too 
far” that I find in Fish’s otherwise justified assault on the politicization of 
the academy. 
Fish is correct that academic work need not be intended to produce 
goods extrinsic to disciplinary knowledge.  Proving Fermat’s theorem is an 
endeavor worthy of mathematicians even if it has no practical payoff.  So, 
too, with a historian’s history of England in the early Middle Ages, or an 
English professor’s interpretation of Paradise Lost. 
Nonetheless, good academic work, even if not guided by extrinsic 
goals, does produce things of immense benefit to the world beyond the 
academy.  A better informed citizenry is one byproduct.  But so, too, are 
better rocket ships and mousetraps, hardier crops, faster computers, 
heightened aesthetic sensibilities, and more agile analytical minds. 
Indeed, if the academy did not serve these external goals, even if 
indirectly as byproducts of academic work, there would be no reason for the 
rest of society to support the academic enterprise.  Why should others spend 
scarce resources on activities that are only of benefit to those who engage in 
them?  Again, to say that the academy must produce valuable goods for 
others is not to say that producing such goods should guide academic 
inquiry.  On this point, Fish is correct.  But one can serve a goal without 
being guided by it; and in the case of academic disciplines, one can best 
produce these extrinsic goods if one is not guided by the aim of producing 
them.  The argument is an indirect consequentialist one, but it is 
nevertheless consequentialist.  And Fish should embrace it.  In the end, his 
salary depends on others’ belief in it. 
 
 7  STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 44) (on file with FIU Law Review) (citing Judith Jarvis Thompson, 
Ideology And Faculty Selection, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 160). 
